

KARṢṆĀJINI AND KĀŚAKṚTSNA

HAJIME NAKAMURA

Tokyo

After the ancient Upaniṣads of the early period came into existence, the school line which follows them as sacred canon continued on without interruption in an unbroken line. Accordingly, there must also have been a great number of scholars who advocated special doctrines among them, but, in the extremely ancient period, the individual names as well as the thought of these schools have practically been not passed down. Generally classifying the early Vedānta schools, we can divide them into those prior to and those posterior to the compilation of the *Brahma-sūtra* and in relation to the period prior to the *Brahma-sūtra*, since no literature at all of the Vedānta school itself has been handed down, it may be said that the thought of the individual scholars then is, for the most part, not clear. However, throughout the literature in other areas, we are able to learn in general the tendency of thought of the Vedānta school during this period. We are able to consider the tendency in thought which we learn from literary sources, but even to know the names and thought of the individual scholars is almost completely impossible. In the *Brahma-sūtra* the fundamental scripture of this school, some of the names of the early scholars have been noted, and not only has their thought been discussed and criticized, but their names have been referred to also in works of other areas; thus in the following, we shall take up the examination of the character and thought of two scholars.

SECTION I. KARṢṆĀJINI

In the *Brahma-sūtra* (III.1. 9), it says :

“If it be said that corresponding to whatever conduct (*caranā*) (in this world), (one is variously born in the womb), it is not so.

(The word *caranā* in this sacred verse) refers indirectly (to the residual karma). So said Karṣṇājini”. And this distinction has been set forth in the following sacred verse :

“Therefore, the man who performs good conduct (*caranā*) in this world may aspire to be able to be born in a good womb, i.e., that of a Brahmin, or that of a Kṣatriya, or that of a Vaiśya. But the one who performs defiled conduct in this world, can expect to be born into a defiled womb, i.e. that of a dog, a pig, or a Caṇḍāla (a type of lowly people)” (*Chand. Up.* V. 10. 7). In this verse, however, it is taught the man who performs good and beautiful conduct in this world, after he dies, will be born again as a member of one of the three upper classes, while the man who performs ugly and evil conduct will be born again as a very low and mean person or as an animal, but just what relationship this verse has with the teaching of

the five fires (*pañcāgni vidyā*) taught in the verse immediately preceding it, was discussed among the theologians of that time. The "Teaching of Five Fires" is so called because it says that human beings go to the world of the moon after death, and from there fall down and are reborn upon the earth, dividing the process into five stages, which, under the pretext of being names for ceremonies and rituals, are called "fires". On this question, a certain theologian has interpreted this sacred verse literally (according to the three commentaries¹ on this *sūtra*), and has understood that the wherefore of the conditions at the time of rebirth into this world, is based upon the wherefore of the good and evil conduct at the time when one was active in the previous world, and was thought that that is all there is to it. However that may be, Kāṣṇājini, so as to apply to the teaching of the five fires, interpreted this verse in the following manner. According to him, the word "conduct" (*carita*) of the verse should not be understood in the literal meaning of "behavior" but refers obliquely to the "residual action" (*amyāyā*).²

That is to say, according to the teaching of the Five Fires, man after death proceeds to the world of the moon, accompanied by his action (*karma*) and after he has received his rewards and punishment there, again returns down to the earth and is born again, while in the world of the moon, he does not exhaustively receive the rewards and punishment of his karma and there nullify all karma, as there is still a small amount of karma remaining. Then, it is said that the individual selves accompanied by their remaining karmas, return to enter this world, and are born into the various conditions, in accordance with whatever remaining karma they have.

By the way, such an interpretation has the following difficulty—If one hold that in accordance with whatever remaining karma one has, when he descends from the world of the moon, the individual self is born in varying conditions, even the person who had performed good conduct previously in this world, since it would not be limited to that when he is reborn, must not necessarily be born into a good environment; in that case, the precepts (ethical principles, *dharma*) of behavior taught in the Brāhmanic canon would be meaningless. Against such a criticism, it has been handed down (in the *Brahma-sūtra* III. 1. 10) that he answered: "Because of the fact that one can come into existence by dependence (upon the correct execution of the rituals), it is not (meaningless)". That is to say, karma, which is the motive force directly which can cause a person to be born into a good environment or a good position, consequently, "the remaining karma", while being based on the wherefore of actual performance of the rituals in the present world directly, because these rituals bring out effects, the correct performance of conduct in general is necessary. The man who does not perform correct conduct, cannot obtain good rewards, even if he carries out the rituals; so

1. On the question of the interpretative reading of the *Brahmasūtra* which follows, I have referred to the three ancient commentaries of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja.
2. According to Bhāskara, "action" (*Karma*).

it is said. Accordingly, Kāṣṇājini had embraced the same thought as the verse which says "The Vedas do not purify the man who does not perform correct conduct" (*Vasīṣṭha-smṛiti*, VI-3).¹ Then at the same time, we can know that he had thought that the rituals are the most important essentials for human life, and that the other ethical precepts amount to no more than a supplemental significance to be appended to the rituals.

Since Kāṣṇājini has been referred to in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35) in addition, he was also a scholar of the ritual Mīmāṃsā. And as a scholar of the rituals, his words have also been quoted in the *Kāyāna-sānta-sūtra*.² Even seen from the *Brahma-sūtra*, since Kāṣṇājini was a man who had regarded as very valuable the rituals, there may be no objection if all of these are thought to be one and the same person. In that case, since he was a man prior to the formulation of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, and as he belongs to the period in which the various ritual sūtras were being worked on and produced, he must naturally be thought to be prior to the 4th century A.D. But, to clarify in more detail the dates of his life, is a difficult proposition in the present circumstances.

SECTION 2 KĀŚAKRTSNA

Theories of Kāśakrtsna are quoted in the *Brahma-sūtra* (I. 4.22).

To wit, according to the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the philosopher Yājñavalkya is said to teach his wife Maitreyī in the following manner:

"Verily, not for the sake of the husband³ is the husband dear, but the husband is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear, but the wife is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of the sons are the sons dear, but the sons are dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of wealth is wealth dear, but wealth is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of brahminhood is brahminhood dear, but brahminhood is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of kṣatriyahood is kṣatriyahood dear, but kṣatriyahood is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of the worlds are the worlds dear but the worlds are dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of the gods are the gods dear, but the gods are dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of living beings are living beings dear, but living beings are dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of all is all dear, but all is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, it is the Self alone that should be seen, heard, reflected on and meditated upon." (*Bṛhad. Up.* II. 4.5; cf. IV 5.6.)

Is the ātman (self) expounded here one body or does it have only an individual existence in the individual self, or should one say that there is a great self, a supreme self? These questions had been discussed among Vedānta

1. Based upon the *Brahmasūtra* III.1. 10, it is quoted by all three commentaries.
2. A. Weber: A History of Indian Literature p. 140. Further, his name also appears in Pāṇini's Grammar, *Gaṇapāṭha-upakāśa*, under 11-4-69.
3. *Parivāḥa-kāṇḍya*. This probably could be understood as "because of the husband" or "for the sake of the husband." Other phrases also should be interpreted in the same light.

scholars from quite ancient times, but in the *Brahma-sūtra* (I. 4. 19 ff.) it has been determined that this ātman is not an individual self but the supreme self. By the way, in the passage above, the word "ātman" at the first glance is explained as though it meant the existence of an individual human being, but why is that? On this question, differences of opinion arose between the three schools of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna. The *Brahma-sūtra* (I. 4-22) only states:

Avasthīter iti kāśakṛtsnāḥ.

(Because it exists, so says Kāśakṛtsna.)

And for the passages in the three Commentaries on this, let us note their interpretations:

"Because this supreme self exists also by means of its state as the consciousness self (individual self), it is possible to begin the expostulation in this way on the passages (of the conversation with Maitreyī) by such a non-difference (between the supreme self and individual self)." (Śaṅkara)

asyaiva paramātmāno'nenāpi vijñānātmabhāvenāvasthānād upapannamidan abhedenopakṛtamaṇam.

"(The relation between the highest self and the individual self) is not the relation between the primordial substance and the evolved. Nor does the individual self, which is absolutely separate and different, enter distinctionless (in the highest self) in the state of liberation. But the highest self, even prior to its liberation from the body (i.e. before dying), exists as an aspect of the individual self, and therefore by the non-difference (of the highest self and the individual self), we begin to teach (the passage of the conversation with Maitreyī)." (Bhāskara)

*na prakṛtīvikārahāno nāpy alyantabhināsyasya jīvasya muktyavasthāyām abhede-
dāpatīti, kinī tārhy ukṛtamaṇāt prāg api jīvarūpeṇa paramātmāno 'vasthānād
abhedenopakṛtamaṇa iti.*

"Because (The Brahman) exists as the ātman within the individual self which is his own body, we instruct on the Brahman by means of the word indicating the individual self." (Ramañuja)

*svasārvabhūte jīvātmāny ātmataūvasthīte jīvābadeṇa brahmanprati-
pādanam.*

Since these three ancient commentaries thus give their own different interpretations, we are at a loss to decide which to adopt, but by other criteria we can, I think, ascertain the original meaning of the sūtra.

First of all, since this passage in the *Brahma-sūtra*, lists the theory of Kāśakṛtsna after relating those of the other two scholars (Āśmarathya and Auḍulomi), his is the fixed theory (siddhānta) and, we can conclude, was adopted by the author of the *Sūtra*. Throughout the entire work of the *Brahma-sūtra*, whenever it lists different theories, it is a definite rule to relate

the fixed theory last,¹ and, in this case, that the theory of Kāśakṛtsna is the established theory is also acknowledged by the three ancient commentaries.²

Hereupon, the thought of the *Brahma-sūtra*, which will be discussed on another occasion is the theory of "non-identity, non-difference" in so far as the relation of the Brahman and ātman is concerned, and since this is accepted in general by present day scholars, Kāśakṛtsna also, who had been conformed to by the sūtra-author, must have adopted the "non-identity, non-difference" theory in the same way.³ Moreover, the word *avasthīti* is used in this Sūtra, and we see in other examples of usages⁴ in the *Brahma-sūtra* that this word is employed in the sense that "it exists conditioned temporally and spatially."⁵ Accordingly, in this case, the supreme self, who transcends temporal and spacial limitations, assumes the form of the individual self, and appears in the experiential world,—this is called *avasthīti*. Accordingly, the individual self is not completely identical with the supreme self, but is one part of it. In the passages above of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the teaching which seems at a glance to point to the individual self, is precisely for this purpose, so Kāśakṛtsna has asserted.

An account which can ascertain such a conclusion is to be found in the sub-commentary by Vācaspati-miśra on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

We see in it that in the sub-commentary⁶ on BS. I. 4-22, after relating the general views of the Śaṅkara School that Kāśakṛtsna adopted the theory of non-duality, says, as a rejection of the assertion of those other men who follow the theories of Kāśakṛtsna, the following:

*Ye tu Kāśakṛtsnīyam eva matam āsthāya jīvam paramātmāno'ṇsam
dāakṛts, te'cāṇ kathān niṣkalanī niṣkṛtyaṇ śāntam iti na śrutivirvadhah.*

1. Śaṅkara, in his commentary, has sometimes opposed this rule, but in those cases, his interpretation is mistaken. E.g., see the commentary on *Brahma sūtra-bhāṣya* IV. 3-7 ff.

2. Cf. Hajime Nakamura: Early History of the Vedānta (in Japanese) Part IV. Chap. 3, Sect. 4, I (p. 446 ff.).

3. Thibaut (*Intro.* p. XIX) originally held that Kāśakṛtsna embraced the theory of non-difference (i.e., Nondualistic monism), based upon the sub-commentaries on Śaṅkara's commentary (ad BS. I. 4.22): since then, this assertion has been admitted by Indologists in general, but the supposition is not correct. Insofar as the theory of Kāśakṛtsna in the sūtra is said to be an fixed doctrine (*siddhānta*), Śaṅkara and his commentators stressed that Kāśakṛtsna's theory was nondualistic monism, in order to combine it with their own theory.

4. I. 2.17; I. 3.22; II. 2.4; II. 2.13; II. 2.36; II. 3.24; III. 3.32.

5. Thibaut, Introduction and P. C. Guha, *Jivātmān*, p. 189 hold that this "avasthīti" means "permanent abiding or permanent abode within something," but this interpretation relies too heavily upon Ramañuja's views. No other example agrees with this usage.

6. Bhāmali, p. 337.

"But, for these (scholars) who, based upon the theory of Kāśākṛtsna, teach that the individual self is a part of the supreme self, (if we compare this to what is said in the *Svet. Up.* VI.16, that 'it is without parts, without activity, tranquil', would there not arise a contradiction between (their thought and) revelational scripture?" Hereupon, according to the sub-commentary *Vedāntakalpataru* (a work by Amālananda), it says that by "the men who follow the theories of Kāśākṛtsna" is meant 'the theory of Bhāskara'¹. On the other hand, we find in the commentary of Bhāskara on BS.I.4.22², after he logically refutes the theory of the *māyavādin*, the assertion:

"The presiding deity is different (from the individual self). The individual self, which transmigrates through existences, is a part (of the presiding deity). This fact must by all means be admitted." *tasmād anyā īśvaraś, tad-omśo jivah, saṃsṛitiḥ baddh abhyupeyam*.

Therefore it would correspond nicely to the account mentioned before. Accordingly, not only has Bhāskara himself admitted in this way that his thought is based upon the theory of Kāśākṛtsna, but such an impartial scholar as Vācaspati-miśra has also acknowledged this fact.

Thus, from our considerations above, we are able to form the following conclusions :

1. Kāśākṛtsna has firmly maintained the assertion that the relation between the supreme self and individual self is one of "non-identity and non-difference", and that the individual self is either a part of the supreme self or is a constitutive element of it (*amśa*). This idea is also clearly asserted in BS.I.1.3.43.

2. The thought of Kāśākṛtsna, after being adopted by the *Brahma-sūtra*, was again inherited and developed by Bhāskara. Then, the historical and ideological connection between these thinkers had been believed in with considerable force in one section of the academic world of the period around the 13th century during which time Amālananda had lived.

Furthermore, Kāśākṛtsna had been regarded as the advocator of the established doctrine of the Vedānta school by all the members of that school even in later centuries. The Vallabha school, for example, also attributed the theory in BS. III. 2.29, which discusses the relation of the individual self and the supreme self, to Kāśākṛtsna³.

In the foregoing, we have examined some aspects of Kāśākṛtsna as one of the Vedānta scholars, but he was also a grammarian. (As a grammarian, his name has generally been handed down as Kāśākṛtsni.)

1. "Bhāskaraśca matam, anūdyā dīṅḡayati—ye tvivādinā"—*Kalpataru*, p. 223 (Viz. SS).

2. This corresponds to I. 4-21 in Bhāskara's *Bhāṣya*.

3. Belvalkar, *Lectures*, p. 167.

In the *Mahābhāṣya*, a work of the grammarian Patañjali (c. 150 B.C.), Kāśākṛtsni, as a grammarian, is frequently referred to, and the *Mīmāṃsā* which he taught is called the Kāśākṛtsni, and it is recorded that men who study his work are called "pupils of Kāśākṛtsni" (*Kāśākṛtsnāś*).¹ Again, his study of grammar has also been called Kāśākṛtsna.² And in the *Vākya-padīya* of Bharṭṛhari, it is said that:

"The sūtra which says '*tadarham*' (Pāṇini, V.1.117), is not handed down in any other work on grammar." (*tadarham iti nūrabaddham sūtram vyākaraṇāntara*)—*Vākya*. III.14.566 (p.714).

And concerning this, Helārāja has noted that "Neither the students of Āpīśali nor those of Kāśākṛtsni had read and passed on this Sūtra."³

Consequently, Kāśākṛtsni, like Pāṇini and Āpīśali, was an editor of the sūtra related to grammar, and his work differed from the extant Pāṇinian grammar, and, we can know, had been handed down up to the time of Bharṭṛhari.

As this work has not been transmitted to the present time, its contents, system, etc. are not clear, but according to the records of the later grammatical works, Kāśākṛtsni's book consists of several sūtras which are composed of three chapters (*adhyāya*).⁴

On certain kinds of problems, this work includes rules which differ from the grammar of Pāṇini. Grammarian students of later centuries have also noticed this fact.⁵ Then again, it is known that his work has some points in common with that of Āpīśali.⁶

1. Kāśākṛtsnīnā proktā mīmāṃsā Kāśākṛtsnī, *tām adhitte Kāśākṛtsnī brāhmaṇīti*, (*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, pp. 206, 249, 325.) His name also appears in Pāṇini's *Grammar* Gṛṇḍhīa "Upakā".

2. *Pāṇinīna prokta*. *Pāṇinīyam/Āpīśalam/Kāśākṛtsnam iti* (*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 12). *Pāṇinīyam akāśakam vyākaraṇam* | *Kāśākṛtsnam* | *Gurūlāghavam* | *Āpīśalam dūṣkaratnam* | *Kāśikā* ad IV.3.115) *anyena kṛtā Māthura* *proktā Māthuri vṛttīḥ* | *Pāṇinīyam/Āpīśalam/Kāśākṛtsnam/Kāśikā* ad IV.3.301). These materials are from Kṣitish Chandra Chatterjee, "Kāśākṛtsna", *JHQ*. Vol. VIII, 1932, pp. 224-227).

3. *Āpīśatāḥ Kāśākṛtsnās ca sūtram etan nādhīyate*.

4. *aślakam Pāṇinīyam sūtram/tadadhyāte vīdanti vā/aślakāḥ Pāṇinībḥ/irīkḥ Kāśākṛtsnībḥ* (*Candovṛtti* III. 1-42). *Pāṇinīyam aślakam sūtram, tad adhyāte aślakāḥ/ Pāṇinībḥ/irīkḥ*, *Vāyaḥgrahapadībḥ/irīkḥ*, *Kāśākṛtsnībḥ* (*Kāśikā* IV. 2.65). *Āpīśat-pāṇinībḥ*. *Pāṇinīyavṛṇḍībḥ/Raṇḍībḥ/Kāśākṛtsnībḥ* (*Kāśikā*, VI. 2.36). These are from Chatterjee, *ibid*. See also *Kāśikā* ad V.1.58; Belvalkar: *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 10.

5. Patañjali, in his commentary on Pāṇini's *Grammar* II.1-50, says: *kim punar dīṅḡsam/īṣā pratyayottarapadāyorbhāvati*. On this Kaiyata has noted as follows: *Kāśākṛtsnīśca "Pratyayottarapadāyot" iti sūtram tad vīdīyati Pāṇinīyam tu paśād vīdīyati*. Again, Kṛṣṇasvāmīn, in *Kṛṣṇarāṅgī* (II. 60, S. 114) says that the past passive participle of the root *śvas* according to the Kāśākṛtsna school is not *śvasita*, but must be *śvasta*. *Kāśākṛtsnāś* *asya* (i. e. the root *śvas*) *nīlāyām anīvām dhuk, śvastāḥ vīśvastāḥ* And in the *Mādhavīya-Dhātuvṛtti* also, concerning the root *śvas*, it is said *nīlāyām itam neccanti Kāśākṛtsnā itī Svāmī-Kāśyapau*. (According to Chatterjee, *ibid*).

6. *Āpīśatā-Kāśākṛtsnyos* *tv agraṇtha itī vacanād anyatra praiśedhātāḥ*.—*Kaiyata* ad V. I. 21.

The dates of Kāśakṛtsni's life are not clear, but there is no doubt that he lived prior to Patañjali. And according to the Vartika of Kātyāyana, as it has referred to the rules of Kāśakṛtsni's grammar,¹ he should be prior to Kātyāyana. Again, since there are many instances in which he is mentioned together with Āpiśali, it would not appear that he lived in a period too far distant from that of Āpiśali. Āpiśali, according to an account (VI.1.92) by Pāṇini himself, was one of the predecessors of Pāṇini but Kāśakṛtsni can be taken to be later than Pāṇini.² In which case we may conclude that he probably lived somewhere around 350 to 250 B.C.

Furthermore, Kāśakṛtsni, as already mentioned, is said in an account by Patañjali to have also been a Mīmāṃsā scholar.³ As if to confirm this, there had been handed down in a work of the later Vedānta school of limited nondualism⁴ the legend that Kāśakṛtsna was the author of the Saṅkara-Kāṇḍa. However, just as the legend that Jaimini is the author of the *Mīmāṃsā sūtra* and the *Saṅkara-Kāṇḍa* has not handed down the true facts, this too might amount to no more than a mere legend. That is, it would appear that since the famous name of Kāśakṛtsna as a scholar had been transmitted up until later centuries, there may have originated such a legend spontaneously.

Further, a doubt arises as to whether Kāśakṛtsni and Kāśakṛtsna are not perhaps different people, but insofar as the names of both men greatly resemble each other, and as the learning of Kāśakṛtsni⁵ has been called Kāśakṛtsnam,⁶

1. *dṛṣṭvamsi pratyapottarapadyoś ced itaretarāṣṭrayatvād aprasiddhiḥ* (Kāyāyana, ad II. 1.51, Vol. I, p. 392) Cf. note 5, p. 17
2. Chatterjee, *ibid.*, asserts this on the basis of the passage in Kāśikā on VI. 2-36. Kāśakṛtsna is mentioned in the *upakāśyaḥ, arthavādyaḥ* in *Gaṇapāṭha*, of Pāṇini's grammar but this will not demonstrate that he was earlier than Pāṇini.
3. However, further investigation is necessary to determine what the *mīmāṃsā* in Patañjali had meant.
4. In the work *Taittirīyārṇika*, on the Śrībhāṣya, the following verse is recorded as a quotation from the Taittirīyārṇika:

Karmadevita-brahmagocara śa tridhobdhabhu saurakaratah/ Jaiminer muneh Kāśakṛtsnaś Bādarāyanaś ity atah kramat/
This differs from the traditional theory. On this Vedānadesika, in his work *Adhikaraṇa-sāra*, has explained as follows:

Vyāgrāṇṭhe tu Jaiminyaparatatayā sodeśādhyāy upātā, Saṅkaraś Kāśakṛtsnaś śaṅkara ita karṇaḥ, Taittirīyārṇikaroktiḥ/aira bramaś—śaṅkara na vayan ita mudhā bādhitvā kinchidarthānūvāhas tapacārāṭ kvadā ita ghaṭate by ekatāṭparayogaḥ/

On such a difference related to the problem of the author, Śeṣagovinda, who wrote the commentary on the *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha*, has explained that the *Devatākāṇḍa*, said to be a work by Jaimini, and the work said to be by Kāśakṛtsna are different works. No affirmative grounds exist which might permit this interpretation. (These sources come, however, from Chatterjee, *ibid.*, and S. Kuṇḍaswami Śastri and P. P. Subrahmanya Sastri: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras, Vol. XXVII, 1937. Introd., pp. III-VII).

5, 6. This coincides exactly with the case of the learning of Āpiśali being called *Āpiśala*. E.g., *Āpiśalam adhitē* (Vartika 3 ad Pāṇini IV. 1-14); *Āpiśala-Pāṇinīya-Gaṇamūlāḥ Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. III, p. 125).

and his students are called Kāśakṛtsnāḥ, I think that perhaps later grammatical schools,⁷ the Mīmāṃsā school as well as the Vedānta school, have referred to Kāśakṛtsni as Kāśakṛtsna. Moreover, both the grammatical school and the two Mīmāṃsās have an intimate connection as the two important types of the orthodox brahmanical scholarship from ancient times; the same author has, in many instances, studied both branches of learning, so that it would appear that there is ample reason to believe both persons as one and the same.

Again, Kāśakṛtsna seems to have also been both a Veda scholar and a scholar of the rituals. The name of Kāśakṛtsna as a Vedic scholar is mentioned together with that of Yāska⁸ in a work by Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara-miśra,⁹ and his name is said to appear also in Bodhāyana's *Gṛhye Sūtra*.¹⁰ Again, the name of a scholar Kāśakṛtsni¹¹ has also been given in the Śrauta Sūtra of Kātyāyana, but in the same sūtra, it also refers to a theory by Bādari and that by Kāṭṣṇajini, both being scholars of the ancient Vedānta school. Even in later centuries, since there were many men who were thoroughly versed in the Vedas and in the rituals in general, and who wrote partial explanatory works on them we can judge from these facts that there should be no objection to think that either Kāśakṛtsni or Kāśakṛtsna as a ritual scholar was the same person who had the same name as handed down as the scholar of grammar, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta. In actuality, then, he being chiefly a scholar of the rituals, probably also studied the various other branches of learning.

1. In the *Kṛtārāṇḍikā*, written by Kṛṣṇasvāmin, and in the *Kaṇḍakāṇḍa*, by Vopadeva, Kāśakṛtsna is listed as the name of a grammarian. (Aufrecht, CC. I, p. 103; Aufrecht, Beibl. Cat. p. 175 b.)
2. He was a scholar thoroughly versed in the Black Yajur Veda.
3. A. Weber: *AIL.*, pp. 42, 91.
4. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 433.
5. A. Weber: *HIL.*, pp. 139, 140. *Indische Studien* XIII, S. 398, 418.